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ABSTRACT
This paper describes several techniques to encrypt uncom-
pressed and compressed images. We first present the aims
of image encryption. In the usual ways to encryption, all the
information is encrypted. But this is not mandatory. In this
paper we follow the principles of a technique initially pro-
posed by MAPLES et al. [1] and encrypt only a part of the
image content in order to be able to visualize the encrypted
images, although not with full precision. This concept leads
to techniques that can simultaneously provide security func-
tions and an overall visual check which might be suitable
in some applications like, for example, searching through a
shared image database. The principle of selective encryption
is first applied to uncompressed images. Then we propose
a simple technique applicable to the particular case of JPEG
images. This technique is proven not to interfere with the de-
coding process in the sense that it achieves a constant bit rate
and that bitstreams remain compliant to the JPEG specifica-
tions. Then we develop a scheme called multiple selective
encryption, discuss its properties and conclude.
1. INTRODUCTION
In some applications, it is relevant to hide the content of
a message when it enters an insecure channel. The ini-
tial message prepared by the sender is then converted
into ciphertext prior to transmission. The process of
converting plaintext into ciphertext is called encryption
(see [2] for a review on encryption techniques). The en-
cryption process requires an encryption algorithm and a
key. The process of recovering plaintext from ciphertext
is called decryption. The accepted view among profes-
sional cryptographers (formalized in KIRKHOFF’s law)
is that the encryption algorithm should be published,
whereas the key must be kept secret.
In the field of image cryptography, the focus has been
put on steganography, and in particular on watermark-
ing during the last years (see [3] for a review on water-
marking). Watermarking, as opposed to steganography,
has the additional requirement of robustness against pos-
sible image transformations. Watermarks are usually
made invisible and should not be detectable.
In applications requiring transmission the image is first
compressed, because it saves bandwidth. Then the im-

















Figure 1: Encryption of an image.
The removal of redundancy enhances robustness as it
squeezes out information that might be useful to a crypt-
analyst. However it also introduces known patterns in
the compressed bitstreams, like headers or synchroniza-
tion stamps (called markers), that eases plaintext at-
tacks on the signal. An alternative would be to com-
press after encryption, but it would not be as efficient
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in terms of bandwidth because encrypted information
looks random and is therefore hard to compress. It is
worth noting that, in schemes combining compression
and encryption like the one shown in Figure 1,
• there are two kinds of information: the image and
the key.
• the subjective significance of information contain-
ed in the image is ignored. For example, there
is no distinction between Most Significant Bits
(MSBs) and Least Significant Bits (LSBs).
From Figure 1, it is clear that the receiver should de-
crypt the information before it can decompress the im-
age. This approach has the main drawback that it is
impossible to access the smallest part of information
without knowledge of the key. For example, it would
impossible to search through a general database of fully
encrypted images. A way to address this issue is to use





















Figure 2: Selective encryption mechanism.
The general selective encryption mechanism works as
follows. The image is first compressed (if needed). Af-
terwards the algorithm only encrypts part of the bit-
stream with a well-proven ciphering technique; inci-
dentally a message (a watermark) can be added during
this process. To guarantee a full compatibility with any
decoder, the bitstream should only be altered at places
where it does not compromise the compliance to the
original format. This principle is sometimes referred to
as format compliance. WEN et al. [4] have recently de-
scribed a general framework for format-compliant en-
cryption. In their simulations, they focus on MPEG-
4 video error resilient mode with data partitioning and
discuss which fields can be encrypted. They also pointed
out that the encryption of a variable length code (VLC)
codeword may not result in another valid codeword.
With the decryption key, the receiver decrypts the bit-
stream, and decompresses the image. In principle, there
should be no difference between a decoded image and
an image that has been encrypted and decrypted. How-
ever there might be a slight though invisible difference
if a watermark message has been inserted in the image.
When the decrypting key is unknown, the receiver will
still be able to decompress the image, but this image
will significantly differ from the original. This scenario



















Figure 3: When the decryption key is unknown to the
receiver.
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2. SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION OF
UNCOMPRESSED IMAGES
A very effective method to encrypt an image, which ap-
plies to a binary image, consists in mixing image data
and a message (the key in some sense) that has the same
size as the image: a XOR function is sufficient when
the message is only used once. A generalization to gray
level images is straightforward: encrypt each bitplane
separately and reconstruct a gray level image. With this
approach no distinction between bitplanes is introduced
although the subjective relevance of each bitplane is not
equal.
2.1. Description of a “naive” method
Figure 4 shows an image decomposed in its bitplanes.
Figure 4: LENA and her bitplanes (i7, . . . , i0) starting
from the most significant bit.
The highest bitplanes exhibit some similarities with the
gray level image, but the least significant bitplanes look
random. Because encrypted bits also look random, the
encryption of least significant bitplanes will add noise
to the image. The first “naive” method we have imple-
mented consists in the encryption of the least signifi-
cant bits as illustrated in Table 1. In the same table,
we provide two distortion measures as well: the Mean
Square Error (MSE) and the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
(PSNR).
An advantage of the technique that encrypts the least
significant bits is that plaintext attacks are harder on
random like data.
It should be noted that the security is linked to the abil-
ity to guess the values of the encrypted data. For ex-
ample, from a security point of view, it is preferable to
encrypt the bits that look the most random. However in
practice, the tradeoff is more difficult because the most
relevant information, like DC coefficients in a JPEG en-
coded image, usually are highly predictable.
(a) Original image (b) 3 bits encrypted
MSE = 10.6
PSNR = 37.9 [dB]
(c) 5 bits encrypted (d) 7 bits encrypted
MSE = 171 MSE = 2704
PSNR = 25.8 [dB] PSNR = 13.8 [dB]
Table 1: Illustration of a naive selective encryption
method.
As can be seen from the images drawn in Table 1, we
need to encrypt at least 4 to 5 bitplanes before the degra-
dation is visible. In theory the naive method is relatively
robust to plaintext attacks because it encrypts bitplanes
that contain nearly uncorrelated bit values.
In the next section, we derive an analytical expression
for the error that results from the encryption of least
significant bits. Then we compare the theoretical values
with the values given in Table 1.
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2.2. Calculation of the error
We denote o(x, y), c(x, y) respectively the original im-
age and the selectively encrypted image. The error func-
tion is defined as e(x, y) = o(x, y) − c(x, y). For
each location (x, y), we can write e(x, y) = o(x, y) −
c(x, y) = (o0 − c0) + 2(o1 − c1) + 4(o2 − c2) + . . . =
e0 + 2e1 + 4e2 + . . . where xi denotes the ith bit of x
starting from the least significant bit. Highest bitplanes
exhibit some similarities with the gray level image, but
the least significant bitplanes look random. In the fol-
lowing, bitplanes are supposed to be independent and to
be the realization of a stationary ergodic process.
We can not assume that the probabilities of a 0 or a 1
in each bitplane of the original image, denoted respec-
tively po(0) and po(1), are equal to 12 , except maybe for
the LSBs. However the probabilities of a 0 or a 1 of
the encrypted data, denoted pe(0) and pe(1), should ap-
proximatively be equal to 1
2
. For convenience, we use
the probabilities po(0) = α and po(1) = 1− α.
Thanks to the assumptions of stationarity, the mean and
variance of ek, the error in bitplane k, are respectively









Although 1 bit of information has been encrypted in the
bitplane, the error is not equal to 1 bit on average. This
results from situations where the encrypted bit is equal
to the original bit.
It is now possible to derive σ2e from the σ2ek . If we



















where n is the number of least significant bits that have
been substituted. In the case of po(0) = po(1) = 12 ,
which is an assumption usually valid on the least sig-











Table 2 compares theoretical MSE values with values
computed on LENA and PHOTOGRAPH. It appears that
theoretical values of σ2e are close to the computed values
even for a large number of encrypted bits.
From equation 2, PNSR decreases as
10 log σ2e ≈ 10n log 4− 10 log 6 (3)
♯ Theoretical MSE MSELena MSEPhotograph
1 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 2.5 2.5 2.5
3 10.5 10.6 10.6
4 42.5 42.6 42.5
5 170.5 171 158.4
6 682.5 636.7 654.3
7 2730.5 2714.8 2584.7
















Number of encrypted bitplanes
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Figure 5: PSNR values versus the number of encrypted
bitplanes.
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This linear behavior was confirmed in our experiments
as can be seen from Figure 5.
If only the least significant bit is encrypted, σe is always
≤ 1, but for real images σe ≈ 0.7. This means that
although all bits have been encrypted, the error is less
than 1 bit on average. This results from situations where
the original bit and the encrypted bit are the same. As
a consequence we need to encrypt more bits per pixel
before the image looks degraded.
3. SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION OF
COMPRESSED IMAGES
In the middle of the 90s there have been several papers
on the selective encryption of MPEG streams. MAPLES
et al. [1] proposed an algorithm which encrypts only
the Intra (I) frames of an MPEG stream. However, AGI
et al. [5] reported that the selective encryption of the I
frames only offers a limited level of security, due mainly
to the presence of blocks coded in intra mode in P or
B frames, but also to the high correlation of P and B
frames when they correspond to the same I frame.
Alternative encryption techniques were developed by
other authors. In particular, several techniques have
been proposed for the encryption of DCT based coded
image. A method called zig-zag permutation was orig-
inated by TANG [6]. The basic idea is that instead of
mapping the 8 × 8 block to a 1 × 64 vector in zig-zag
order, the method reorders individual 8 × 8 blocks to
1 × 64 vectors according to a random permutation list.
Although this scheme offers more security, it increases
the overall bit rate. This is explained by the loss of cor-
relation between adjacent coefficients in reordered zig-
zag vectors. As a consequence the HUFFMAN entropy
coding that follows the reordering will result in a lower
compression ratio.
Another algorithm, developed by QIAO and NAHRST-
EDT, is based on the frequency distribution of pairs of
two adjacent bytes in an MPEG bitstream [7]. In their
method, the stream is divided into data segments of 128
bytes. Then two 64-byte lists are generated depending
on the binary value of a 128-bit key. If the binary value
is equal to 0 (resp. 1) then the corresponding byte is put
in the first (resp. second) list. The lists are XORed and
one of them is encrypted with a second key. As proven
by the authors, this algorithm provides overall security,
and size preservation, but does not meet the require-
ments of visual acceptance and bitstream compliance.
Most of the encryption methods either treat entire blocks
or are integral part of the MPEG compression process.
Moreover they are designed to hide all the information.
We require the following properties from our methods:
[visual acceptance] part of information may be visible
but the encrypted image should look noisy,
[selective encryption] encryption occurs after compres-
sion and leaves parts of the bitstream unencrypted,
[constant bit rate] encryption should preserve the size
of the bitstream, and
[bitstream compliance] the encryption step should pro-
duce a compliant bitstream according to the cho-
sen format definition.
Researchers have shown that selective encryption is not
restricted to MPEG encoded images. For example POM-
MER et al. [8] recently proposed techniques for the se-
lective encryption of wavelet packet subband structures.
3.1. A method for the selective encryption of JPEG
images
The method we propose for the selective encryption of
JPEG images is based on the encryption of DCT coef-
ficients. The encryption of the quantified coefficients
prior to the HUFFMAN entropy coding would be inef-
ficient in terms of compression. But it is possible to
modify the way coefficients are encoded.
3.1.1. Description of the method
In JPEG, the HUFFMAN coder aggregates zero coeffi-
cients into runs of zeros. In order to approach the en-
tropy, it also uses symbols that combine the run of ze-
ros with magnitude categories for the non-zero coeffi-
cients that terminate the runs (see [9] for a complete
explanation of the JPEG encoding). 8-bit code words
are assigned by the HUFFMAN coder to these symbols.
These code words are followed by appended bits that
fully specify the sign and magnitude of the non-zero
coefficients. We decided to leave the code words but
to encrypt the appended bits. The reasons are that code
words are essential for synchronization and that it does
not make much sense to replace zero coefficients by
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non-zero coefficients. Therefore it was essential to pre-
serve the run values. Also, it is not effective to encrypt
DC coefficients because they carry important visible
information and are highly predictable.
Our algorithm encrypts appended bits corresponding to
a selected number of AC coefficients. Figure 6 illus-
trates two cases: all coefficients are encrypted except
(a) the DC coefficient or (b) the DC, AC0, . . . , AC4
coefficients.
(a) DC (b) DC, AC0, . . . , AC4
MSE = 1096 MSE = 348
PSNR = 17.7 [dB] PSNR = 22.7 [dB]
Figure 6: JPEG encrypted images.
3.1.2. Image quality
The degradation of the selectively encrypted image was
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Figure 7: PSNR values versus the number of coeffi-
cients left unencrypted (including the DC coefficient).
The absolute PSNR will depend on the original JPEG
image, on its compression ratio, and on the amplitude
of DCT coefficients. As a rule of thumb, we found that
the number of coefficients left unencrypted should be
less than 5.
3.1.3. Performances
Our method does not require the encryption to occur
inside the coder. In our experiments, the compression
and encryption steps have been separated. Although
this leads to a slight overhead in execution speed, it has
the advantage that the code is reusable for any encoded
JPEG image. For this implementation, the encryption
steps are:
• read the JPEG bitstream,
• build the Huffman tables as specified in the im-
age,
• extract DCT coefficients,
• proceed to encryption, and
• replace the bits in the bitstream.
Real-time processing is easily achievable. Table 3 pro-
vides the execution times obtained for LENA (512×512,
24-bit color image) on a 1.33 GHz Pentium. The first
column mentions the number of bit per pixel (bpp) of
the JPEG encoded image. Execution times were mea-
sured for three different encryption algorithms (DES,
triple-DES and IDEA).
Encrypted bits Execution speed [ms]
bpp total per bloc DES 3-DES IDEA
3.62 275904 22.45 77 82 75
2.14 135744 11.05 45 48 44
1.01 52864 8.6 19 20 19
0.49 13760 2.24 8 9 8
Table 3: Execution times in [ms] (see [10]).
3.1.4. Note on security
As in other cases, some coefficients may be correctly
guessed. That will allow a plaintext attack in which
a known message is send to the encoder. Therefore we
should choose an encryption method that is not sensible
to this kind of attack. But this is a general requirement,
not particular to our method.
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3.2. Multiple selective encryption
In some applications, images have several copyright own-
ers. Suppose the first copyright owner applies the selec-
tive DCT encryption algorithm on the JPEG image f
with a key k1. The resulting image is g = Ek1(f). The
decryption algorithm D is able to recompute f when
k1 is known: f = Dk1(Ek1(f)). If there is a sec-
ond copyright owner, he could be given the opportunity
to encrypt the image too, with his own key k2. The
image sent on the network is then h = Ek2(Ek1(f)).
We called this principle “multiple selective encryption”
as it was inspired by multiple watermarking described
by SHEPPARD et al. in [11]. In fact, TUCHMAN [12]
proposed a technique called over-encryption that corre-
sponds to Ek1(Dk2(Ek1(f))). According to SCHNEI-
ER [2], this last scheme offers better performances than
Ek2(Ek1(f)) in terms of robustness against attacks.
The ideas of multiple selective encryption or selective
over-encryption are illustrated in Figure 8. In this ex-
ample, 3 coefficients were left unencrypted except for
Dk2() of image 8(d) for which we only preserved 2 co-
efficients. Many variations can be worked out just by
modifying the number of coefficients and the order of
E() or D() steps.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two methods for the selective
encryption of an image. The first method is applicable
to raster images. The second method is an adaptation of
the JPEG compression scheme that offers both a con-
stant bit rate and format compliance. It consists in the
encryption of the sign and magnitude of non-zero DCT
coefficients. We also explain how it can be used for
multiple selective encryption.
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